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Towards a Computational Account of
Inferentialist Meaning
Paul Piwek1
Abstract. Both in formal and computational natural language se-
mantics, the classical correspondence view of meaning – and, more
specifically, the view that the meaning of a declarative sentence co-
incides with its truth conditions – is widely held. Truth (in the world
or a situation) plays the role of the given, and meaning is analysed in
terms of it. Both language and the world feature in this perspective
on meaning, but language users are conspicuously absent. In con-
trast, the inferentialist semantics that Robert Brandom proposes in
his magisterial book ‘Making It Explicit’ puts the language user cen-
tre stage. According to his theory of meaning, the utterance of a sen-
tence is meaningful in as far as it is a move by a language user in
a game of giving and asking for reasons (with reasons underwritten
by a notion of good inferences). In this paper, I propose a proof-
theoretic formalisation of the game of giving and asking for reasons
that lends itself to computer implementation. In the current proposal,
I flesh out an account of defeasible inferences, a variety of inferences
which play a pivotal role in ordinary (and scientific) language use.
1 INTRODUCTION
Formal semantics emerged as a field in the wake of the seminal work
by Richard Montague [22]. Montague developed a formal semantics
for fragments of English, where his point of departure was the classi-
cal truth-conditional view of meaning: meaning as analysed in terms
of truth (in a model), without further analysis of the concept of truth
itself.
Though Montague’s original framework was modified and refined
in numerous ways, its truth-conditional foundation has remained
largely unshaken. Witness, for example, Kamp & Reyle’s ‘From dis-
course to logic’:
‘Since truth and falsity are of such paramount importance,
and since it is in virtue of their meaning that thoughts and ut-
terances can be distinguished into those that are true and those
that are false, it is natural to see the world-directed, truth-value
determining aspect of meaning as central; and, consequently, to
see it as one of the central obligations of a theory of meaning
to explain how meaning manifests itself in the determination of
truth and falsity.’ Page 11 of Kamp & Reyle [15]
In ‘From discourse to logic’, Hans Kamp (who studied with Mon-
tague) and Uwe Reyle present Discourse Representation Theory
(DRT), a detailed account of natural language interpretation that de-
scribes how a representation of the meaning of a discourse can be
computed incrementally from the contributions of individual sen-
tences. This took formal semantics beyond the boundary of the
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sentence into the domain of extended discourse and intersentential
anaphora. Each sentence is viewed as giving rise to an update of the
meaning representation of the discourse so far. As a result, the field
of formal semantics took a dynamic turn. The truth-conditional foun-
dations were however retained. For instance, in DRT, the meaning of
the representation of a discourse is essentially truth-conditional – it is
given in terms of an embedding relation between that representation
and a model.2
The truth-conditional approach has been very fruitful. Over the
past fourty years, it has led to numerous insights into natural lan-
guage semantics, ranging from the interpretation of intra- and inter-
sentential anaphora, tense, aspect and intensional contexts to plural-
ity and generalised quantifiers. It has also been developed further in
some of the most advanced work in computational semantics (e.g.,
[4]). Though the dynamic turn has blurred the boundaries between
semantics and pragmatics, on the whole, the traditional separation
of linguistic studies into syntax, semantics and pragmatics is still in
force. The dynamic turn did stimulate studies into construction of
semantic representations with reference to language users, but the
semantic import of these representations themselves is still analysed
in terms of a correspondence relation between the representation and
models. In other words, the way the meaningfulness of these repre-
sentations is accounted for still leaves the language user out of the
picture.
From the point of view of Artificial Intelligence (and, more gen-
erally, the Cognitive Sciences), an account of meaning that has little
to say about how the capacity to produce meaningful utterances is
part of a language user’s capacities for interacting with others and
the world (through communication, perception and action) is rather
unsatisfactory. From this point of view, the work by the philosopher
Robert Brandom provides a promising alternative theory of meaning.
Brandom [6] puts forward an analysis of meaning in terms of a game
of giving and asking for reasons. In this game, the language user is
central: sentences acquire meaning by virtue of their use in such a
game. From the point of view of the programme of Artificial Intel-
ligence, this game provides a way to link meaning with an agent’s
capacities for inference, action and perception.
In this paper I aim to show how playing a game of giving and ask-
ing for reasons involves the language user’s capacity for inference,
2 The algorithmic sentence-by-sentence construction of representations of
discourse meaning has been taken to a new level in Dynamic Syntax (DS)
[16], which models the construction of these representations as an incre-
mental left-to-right word-by-word process. However, also in Dynamic Syn-
tax, the emphasis is primarily on how the representations are build from
linguistic input and less on how these representations acquire semantic
import. The current proposal can be thought of as a step towards a non-
truthconditional inferentialist semantics for incremental theories of inter-
pretation such as DRT and DS.
perception and action. Each of these capacities is taken to be compu-
tational in nature. Thus we arrive at a theory of meaning that is de-
cidedly computational - eschewing reference to non-computational
notions such as truth in a model.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In the next
section, I examine two puzzles associated with the truth-conditional
perspective. These puzzles emerge when we ask how language users
deploy meaning in perception and conversation. I provide a sketch
of how each of the two puzzles can be solved whilst sticking with
a truth-conditional concept of meaning. I then, however, proceed to
show how these solutions (especially when they are taken jointly)
give rise to further problems. I draw the conclusion that exploration
of an alternative non-truth-conditional account of meaning is war-
ranted.
In Section 3, I present the outline of such an account based on
Brandom’s work. Though it is inspired by Brandom’s proposals, it
is not intended as a complete or even literalist exegesis: I only cover
a subset of Brandom’s intricate system, and there are points where I
deviate from the original. After briefly indicating which ingredients
of Brandom’s work I take to be of principal importance, I also draw
attention to some differences between the current proposal and that
of Kibble [17].
Section 4 presents my attempt to take some of Brandom’s key in-
sights and turn them into a computational theory of meaning. The
game of giving and asking for reasons is formalised and shown to
be playable by an agent with certain (computationally grounded) ca-
pacities for inference, action and perception. A pivotal role is played
by a proof-theoretic account of defeasible inference. This account al-
lows us to define the interface between reasoning on the one hand
and action and perception on the other, without falling into the em-
piricist trap – i.e., what Sellars dubs the myth of the given [31]: the
myth that observation sentences are meaningful outside of the rich
web of inferential connections between the sentences of a language.
Some aspect of the formalisation are then illustrated in Section 5.
There I analyse certain features of a short dialogue fragment in terms
of the game of giving and asking for reasons.
Finally, Section 6 reviews the current proposal and points forward
to further work.
2 PUZZLES AND PROBLEMS
2.1 The Puzzle of the Use of Meaning in Perception
Firstly, there is the puzzle of the practical use of meaning in per-
ception. Let us assume, for the moment, that the truth-conditional
account of meaning is correct. Let us also assume that understanding
a sentence amounts to grasping its meaning, i.e. in this case its truth
conditions. We will explore how, on these assumptions, a language
user can deploy the meaning of a sentence to make judgements about
its truth in a concrete situations.
Take for instance the sentence ‘John has measles’. Grasping its
meaning would involve the ability to distinguish between situations
in which ‘John has measles’ is true and those in which it is false (ad-
ditionally, as in Situation Semantics [2], we may also need to allow
for the sentence to be neither true nor false in those situations where
John isn’t present). Now, human language users can’t apply mean-
ings directly to situations which they find themselves in, if we con-
ceive of meaning in this way. In practice a language user isn’t always
able to tell correctly whether the situation itself is one in which ‘John
has measles’. If they could do so, they would be perfect truth tellers.
Sometimes they get deceived by appearances, even when they have
taken all the available evidence on board. For example, they may de-
cide that John has measles because he shows all the symptoms of
measles including what appears to be a rash. Their conclusion may
nevertheless be wrong, because the ‘rash’ really is only the result of
liberally applying a red marker pen.3
The lesson I draw from this example is that in practice a language
user will never be entirely certain that they have looked at a situation
carefully enough or in sufficient detail. So, they are never quite sure
which situation out of many possible ones, they find themselves in.
Therefore, they are never able to apply meanings (conceived as truth
conditions) directly to the situation at hand. Clearly, we need a more
elaborate story to explain how meaning as truth conditions is applied
in perception.
One possible story goes as follows. We need to relax the idea that
in perception a language user tests whether the meaning of a sentence
applies to the actual situation at hand. Rather, they somehow make
an informed guess about which class of situations they currently find
themselves in and then check whether these are a subset of the set of
situations in which the sentence is true (i.e., they compare it against
the meaning of the sentence). This shifts the problem to how we, as
finite human beings, can somehow store such large, possibly infinite,
sets of situations and compare them with each other in a reasonable
amount of time. It also doesn’t give us a mechanism for making in-
formed guesses about the class of situations that we find ourselves
in. Part of the purpose of this paper is to show that once we take in-
ference rather than truth as our primitive, a solution to this puzzle is
available.
2.2 The Puzzle of Truth-conditionally Equivalent
Sentences
Secondly, there is the puzzle of truth-conditionally equivalent sen-
tences. This one is particularly grating in the case of mathematical
knowledge. If one subscribes to the view that true mathematical state-
ments are true in every possible situation or world, then the truth-
conditional conception of meaning entails that any two true mathe-
matical statements have the same meaning. So, Go¨del’s incomplete-
ness theorems mean the same as, for instance, 1+1 = 2. This doesn’t
seem to sit well with our everyday use of the notion of meaning.4 If
the meanings are the same, how can we nevertheless avoid the un-
desirable consequence that when they are put to practical use they
become indistinguishable? A possible answer lies in the observation
that although two statements may have the same meaning, it may
not be trivial to establish this: whether two mathematical functions
(representing truth conditions) are one and the same may in practice
not be decidable (it would involve comparing a potentially infinite
number of input–output pairs).
The puzzle of truth-conditionally equivalent sentences surfaces
also for statements about the observable world. Consider the fol-
lowing variation on Frege’s puzzle. The statements ‘Achilles looks
3 One may argue that they’ve simply not investigated the situation carefully
enough. They should have checked that the red marks on John’s body were
indeed part of a rash, rather than ink marks. But now consider the following
situation. John really has a rash but rather deviously: 1) concealed the red
patches with mascara and 2) used a felt tip to insert red dots in the clear
areas. Having discounted the observable red marks, our language user may
conclude that John doesn’t have rash. But then, some further investigation
would tell them that the rash is hidden and John has measles after all. In
principle, there is no end to the possibility of such double, triple, quadruple,
and so on, deceptions.
4 Claiming that one understands the meaning of 1 + 1 = 2 doesn’t commit
one to also understanding the meaning of Go¨del’s first (or second) incom-
pleteness theorem.
at the morning star’ and ‘Achilles looks at the evening star’ are
true in exactly the same situations, since ‘the morning star’ and ‘the
evening star’ both refer to Venus. Therefore, according to the truth-
conditional account, these statements mean the same thing. Now,
the ancient Greeks didn’t know that both names refer to Venus. An
ancient Greek wouldn’t affirm that ‘Achilles looks at the morning
star’ follows from ‘Achilles looks at the evening star’. On the truth-
conditional account they should however do so. Somehow the ancient
Greeks seem to have only had partial knowledge of the meaning of
each of these sentences. When we learned that both ‘the morning
star’ and ‘the evening star’ refer to Venus, we somehow extended
our partial knowledge of the meaning. Such an answer suggest that
we need to look for a notion of partial knowledge of truth-conditional
meanings. If we formalise meaning as a function from situations to
truth values, this suggest that partial knowledge involves restricting
the set of situations in which the ancient Greeks were able to apply
the meanings (technically, we narrow the domain of the function, e.g.
such that they can only apply one of the sentences in the morning and
the other in the evening).
2.3 From Puzzles to Problems
The second puzzle suggests that we need, in addition to the notion of
truth-conditional meaning, a further notion of partial knowledge of
meanings. Once we make the move to (partial) knowledge of mean-
ing, one can ask whether truth-conditional meaning itself, as a op-
posed to any partial knowledge of it, is required at all. Is it possi-
ble to let go of fully fledged truth-conditional meanings in favour of
partial representations of meanings, that are not dependent on some
underlying complete, as opposed to partially known, meaning? Is it
perhaps reasonable to apply Occam’s razor and get rid of these com-
plete meanings? There is some evidence that this is not such a bad
move. If we stick to the idea that complete truth-conditional meaning
is the foundation for any notion of meaning or partial knowledge of
meaning, we rule out making sense of the verbal practices that in-
volve concepts, such as phlogiston, that at a later date turned out not
to refer at all. We now know in 2014 that in all possible situations, the
sentence ‘phlogiston is present’ is false. Does it follow that therefore
its meaning has been void all along (and speaking of partial knowl-
edge of that meaning is meaningless as well)? If so, how could this
meaning have governed the use of the term prior to the renunciation
of the term? Were the interlocutors that used this term prior to its
rejection, merely making meaningless noises?
Let me outline one further argument. Go¨del’s incompleteness re-
sults have been used in support of the claim that the human mind
cannot be adequately modelled as an algorithm or formal system
[18]. Go¨del sentences demonstrate that, given any sufficiently com-
plex formal system, there will be sentences about the system which
are true but not provable within the system. The unrestricted truth-
conditional view of meaning seems to however endow us with an
absolute ability to determine whether a sentence is true, once we
have grasped its (complete) meaning. I would like to suggest that
we can reverse the argument and use this powerful property of truth-
conditional meaning to argue against it. Is it really sensible to assume
that we, as human beings, can decide for any sentence (even about
ourselves) whether it is true, once we have grasped its meaning? Is
it really impossible that each of us has their own Go¨del sentences.
In this case, the truth-conditional view of meaning may incorrectly
endow us with powers that it is impossible for us to have.
In this section, I have drawn attention to three problems with the
truth-conditional view of meaning. Firstly, we need to tell a supple-
mentary story to show how this approach can be made to address
the puzzles about perception and equivalence: there is a gap between
the idea of meaning as function from situations to truth values, and
the everyday use of meanings in perception and conversation. Sec-
ondly, such a story seems to introduce a notion of partial knowledge
or representations of meaning. Once this move is made, it is however
not evident why we can’t start from such partial knowledge or repre-
sentations in the first place, rather than retain the practically inactive
truth-conditional meanings. Thirdly, though Go¨del’s incompleteness
results are normally used to argue that human minds aren’t mere
computers, one can just as well argue that, on the assumption that
human minds are computers, the notion of truth-conditional mean-
ing doesn’t fit with the sort of meanings that we actually are able to
grasp and deploy.
3 SKETCH OF AN INFERENTIALIST
APPROACH
We have seen that several puzzles and problems emerge from the as-
sumption that meaning equals truth conditions. This not to say that
there is no way to solve these puzzles and problems satisfactorily
whilst sticking to the truth-conditional view. We could try to for-
mulate a notion of knowledge of the truth-conditional meaning of a
sentence, which allows for partial knowledge of meanings and intro-
duces limits to computations that are afforded by this knowledge. An
alternative strategy, which we explore here is to start with an infer-
entialist account of meaning that acknowledges from the outset the
computational nature of meaning.
The inferentialist conception of meaning goes back to Gentzen’s
work on natural deduction [11]. Gentzen suggests that in natural de-
duction introduction rules for logical connectives define the meaning
of these connectives. Additionally, it also has roots in the Brouwer–
Heyting–Kolmogorov explication of intuitionistic truth in terms of
proof construction. The use of natural deduction to get a handle
on meaning has been advanced, most prominently, by Prawitz (e.g.
[28]) and Dummett (e.g. [10]). The Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov
idea of proof construction has culminated, via the Curry–Howard–
de Bruijn correspondence between logic and type theory, in Martin-
Lo¨f’s Constructive Type Theory [19].
The main focus of all the aforementioned efforts has been on mod-
elling the meaning of mathematical statements, though there have
also been some recent efforts to apply Martin-Lo¨f style semantics to
natural language (e.g. Ranta [29], Ahn [1], Piwek & Krahmer [27]).
The main pay-off of this strand of inferentialism has been a finer-
grained notion of meaning in terms of proof rather than truth con-
ditions. This allows one to address, among other things, the truth-
conditional equivalence problem (as described above). It also also
provides the means for a powerful analysis of anaphora and presup-
position (that, arguably, improves on Discourse Representation The-
ory [15]).
There are however some limitations to this strand of work. Firstly,
its primarily mathematical orientation means that defeasible infer-
ences, which are rife in everyday and also scientific reasoning, are
glossed over (but see the proposal on pages 20–26 of Piwek [23],
which we develop further in Section 4.9). Secondly, the intuition-
istic foundations of this work have given it the reputation of being
revisionist in orientation (aiming to critique and revise existing lin-
guistic practices, rather than model those practices as we find them).
Thirdly, the idea that meaning corresponds with proof conditions (as
in the work of Martin-Lo¨f), is one-sided (and reminiscent of the ear-
lier verificationis programme) – Dummett has, however, drawn at-
tention to this issue and has suggested that the meaning of a sen-
tence consists of two components: its justifications (i.e. proofs) and
its consequences. Finally, proof-theoretic work on meaning has con-
centrated on rules for the meaning of the logical connectives. The
meaning of non-logical vocabulary is left unanalysed and its inferen-
tial potential is only explored when its inferential relations are made
explicit using logical vocabulary. This suggest a dependence of non-
logical vocabulary on the logical vocabulary. The proposal that fol-
lows rejects the idea that logical vocabulary is needed to specify a
semantics for non-logical vocabulary.
A comprehensive inferentialist alternative is offered by Brandom.
A condensed description of this alternative can be found in Bran-
dom’s [7] and also Wanderer [33], whereas the full account is laid
out by Brandom in [6]. What follows is a summary of the key tenets.
Brandom brings language users into the picture from the start, ask-
ing the question: What makes us treat a person’s utterances as mean-
ingful? Brandom’s answer is that we ascribe meaning provided that
we can understand this person’s actions as moves in a certain kind
of dialogue game. This approach is reminiscent of Dennett’s inten-
tional stance and Turing’s test for intelligence: we are not required to
examine the inner life of the meaning maker, merely whether their
behaviour can be profitably described in a certain way. However,
in contrast with Turing, who proposed a practical test for intelli-
gence, Brandom is interested in giving a theoretical account. This
account consists of a specification of the dialogue game in question.
This game is referred to as the game of giving and asking for rea-
sons. Its description is normative, i.e. in terms of rules for how to
correctly play the game – Brandom does not attempt a reduction of
the game to non-normative language and seems to be non-committal
about whether such a reduction is possible.
We briefly outline the game’s key features, which we formalise
in the next section. This is to be understood as our interpretation
of the game, rather than a entirely faithful rendering of Brandom’s
proposal. In particular, we will gloss over Brandom’s distinction be-
tween endorsement and attribution.
• Participants can make one of five moves: 1) assert a sentence, 2)
challenge a sentence, 3) retract a sentence, 4) make an observation,
and 5) perform an action.
• For each participant, we keep track of the sentences they have
asserted, i.e. their non-inferential commitments. We call this the
participant’s commitment store.
• A participant is consequentially committed to a sentence if it fol-
lows from their commitments via commitment preserving infer-
ences.
• A participant is entitled to sentence if the entitlement to the sen-
tence is not blocked through an incompatibility inference and a)
the sentence hasn’t been challenged or b) a challenge is addressed
by: 1) asserting another sentence, which the participant is entitled
to, and from which the earlier sentence follows, or 2) asserting
that the sentence is inherited from the entitlements of another par-
ticipant.5
5 The key idea here is that one is only entitled to a commitment in so far as
one has defended it against any challenges. Challenging another person’s
commitments is one way in which the meaning of sentences (in terms of
its inferential relations with other sentences) is put to work, and sustained.
I would like to point out that this view is foreshadowed in Mill’s defence
of the freedom of speech [21], where he argues that an uncontested but true
common opinion is in danger of losing its very meaning; see, in particular,
the summary of his argument at the end of Chapter II: ‘Thirdly, even if the
received opinion be not only true, but the whole truth; unless it is suffered
to be, and actually is, vigorously and earnestly contested, it will, by most
of those who receive it, be held in the manner of a prejudice, with little
• A sentence follows from another one if it follows through a single
or combination of any of the entitlement preserving, commitment
preserving and incompatibility inferences.
• An incompatibility inference is an inference where a commitment
to a sentence prohibits entitlement to another sentence. Entitle-
ment preserving inferences are defeasible: an entitlement preserv-
ing inference can be blocked by an incompatibility inference.
• Observations can entitle one to certain sentences and sentential
entitlements can entitle one to certain actions via dialogue game
entry and exit rules, respectively.
• Entitlements can be inherited from other participants. In particu-
lar, one can justify entitlement to a claim by referring the chal-
lenger to someone else who made that claim, relying on that per-
son’s ability to furnish the reasons, if challenged.6
• All sentences in the most basic version of this type of game are
non-logical, i.e. free from logical vocabulary. Extending the game
with logical vocabulary and appropriate inferences is viewed as a
adding a new layer to a game. This layer allows one to play a game
in which the inferences of the original game can be expressed ex-
plicitly. Brandom refers to this conception of logical vocabulary as
logical expressivism. He generalises this in [8] where elaborates
on the idea that one vocabulary can make explicit the practices in
which another vocabulary is used.
4 FORMALISATION OF THE
INFERENTIALIST APPROACH
The proposal in this section continues a long-running programme to
develop a formal inferentialist semantics as a viable alternative to tra-
ditional truth-conditional semantics (Piwek [23]; Piwek & Krahmer
[27]; Piwek [25]; Piwek [26]). It engages with the proof-theoretic
tradition, in contrast with Brandom and Aker’s work on formalising
his insights.
One of the few other formalisations of (part of) Brandom’s work
can be found in Kibble [17]. There are a number of ways in which the
current proposal differs from Kibble’s. The main one is that Kibble
does not elaborate on how interlocutors draw or compute inferences,
including defeasible ones. Also, in contrast with Kibble, the current
proposal defines a game that lacks logical vocabulary (such as →
and ¬). In the current game, background knowledge about meaning
is modelled in terms of inference rules, rather than explicit (logically
complex) formulae in the communication language. This is more in
the spirit of Brandom’s layer cake model of language games.7
4.1 Commitment Stores and Commitments
Each interlocutor X has a positive and negative commitment store:
Γ+X and Γ
−
X . New sentences are introduced by X into these commit-
ment stores through assertion and denial dialogue acts, respectively
comprehension or feeling of its rational grounds. And not only this, but,
fourthly, the meaning of the doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost,
or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct:
the dogma becoming a mere formal profession, inefficacious for good, but
cumbering the ground, and preventing the growth of any real and heartfelt
conviction, from reason or personal experience.’
6 The formalisation of inheritance of entitlement is beyond the scope of the
current paper.
7 A further difference is that Kibble includes a mechanism for getting par-
ticipants to agree on commitments, i.e. to build up a common ground. This
takes us beyond the game of giving and asking for reasons as specified
by Brandom and, in our view, is orthogonal to the concerns of Brandom’s
game.
(Section 4.7). We use Γ as a shorthand for 〈Γ+,Γ−〉, with subscripts
for agents omitted where this doesn’t result in ambiguity.
The (positive/negative) commitments of an interlocutor consist of
those commitments that have been directly asserted or denied and
also any commitments that follow (monotonically) from these. This
results in the following definition:
(Positive and negative commitment) An interlocutor’s posi-
tive/negative commitments consist of those sentences that are
monotonically affirmed/refuted by their commitment store
〈Γ+,Γ−〉.
Affirmation and refutation are defined below (Section 4.4).
4.2 Challenges
Each interlocutor X has a set of positive and negative challenges:
Ξ+X and Ξ
−
X . These consist of sets of sentence whose assertion or
denial by X has been challenged.
4.3 Open Challenges
Each interlocutor X has a set of positive and negative open chal-
lenges: Ω+X and Ω
−
X . These consist of sentences ψ such that their
assertion or denial has been challenged, i.e. a reason has been asked
for the asserted or denied sentence and ψ is not non-monotonically
affirmed (‘`NM ’) or refuted (‘aNM ’) by the commitments ofX (af-
ter ψ itself has been removed – ψ does not count as a reason for
itself). The notions of non-monotonic affirmation and refutation are
defined in Section 4.10.
(Positive open challenges) ψ ∈ Ω+X if and only if (a) ψ ∈ Ξ+X , (b)
ψ ∈ Γ+X and (c) not 〈Γ+X − {ψ},Γ−X〉NM ` ψ
(Negative open challenges) ψ ∈ Ω−X if and only if (a) ψ ∈ Ξ−X , (b)
ψ ∈ Γ−X and (c) not 〈Γ+X ,Γ−X − {ψ}〉 aNM ψ
Open challenges can be addressed in two ways: one can provide a
reason for the challenged sentence (by asserting or denying another
sentence), but it is also possible to retract the sentence. The dialogue
acts for doing so are specified in Section 4.7.
4.4 Judgements: Affirmations and Refutations
Given a set of positive and negative commitments Γ = 〈Γ+,Γ−〉,
we write:
(Affirmation) Γ ` φ for φ is monotonically affirmed by Γ.
(Refutation) Γ a φ for φ is monotonically refuted by Γ
We define judgements in terms of affirmations and refutations:
(Judgement) A judgement is either an affirmation or a refutation.
The inferential role of mononotic affirmation and refutation is de-
fined in Section 4.9.
4.5 Inconsistency
The commitment store Γ = 〈Γ+,Γ−〉 is inconsistent if there is a
sentence φ that is both affirmed (signified by ‘Γ ` φ’) and refuted
monotonically (signified by ‘Γ a φ’).
(Inconsistency) 〈Γ+,Γ−〉 is inconsistent if and only if for some φ:
〈Γ+,Γ−〉 ` φ and 〈Γ+,Γ−〉 a φ
4.6 Entitlements
(Entitlement) Interlocutor X is positively/negatively entitled to φ
iff φ is non-monotonically affirmed/refuted by ΓX and for any
open challenge ψ, the sentence φ is non-monotonically affirmed
or refuted by ΓX − {ψ}.
In words, one is only entitled to those sentences that follow non-
monotonically from one’s commitments and which will still hold,
even if one needs to retract sentences that are currently open chal-
lenges. We presuppose that ΓX is consistent. Note also that, if φ is
monotonically affirmed/refuted by Γ, then by definition (see Section
4.10) it is also non-monotonically affirmed/refuted.
4.7 Dialogue Acts
We assume that a contribution to the dialogue game is the utterance
of a sentence φ with a certain force by a speaker (S) to an addressee
(A). Contributions are mapped to one of four types of dialogue acts:
assertion, denial, asking for a reason (of an assertion or denial) and
retraction (of an assertion or denial).
The inclusion of denial is unconventional. As put nicely by Smiley,
in modern logic, ‘[l]ike the grey squirrel and red squirrel, assertion
and negation have all but driven out rejection’ [32]. Smiley observes
that natural languages do, however, provide us with the means to
express denial (or in his words, rejection) directly without resorting
to assertion and negation, as in the answer ‘No’ to a polar question
‘P?’
Apart from the fact that denial is a part of everyday language use,
there are theoretical grounds for its inclusion. It is possible to extend
my interpretation [26] of Brandom’s logical expressivism to nega-
tion, once we have adopted denial as the counterpart of assertion.
This gives us a system8 in which negation (similar to implication)
can be conceived of as a means for making an underlying practice
explicit; in this case the practice of denial. Additionally, the resulting
system is classical (and harmonious in Dummett’s sense), rather than
intuitionistic (i.e., Γ ` φ is derivable from Γ ` ¬¬φ). This allows
us to address the common unease with proof-theoretic accounts of
meaning as a result of their supposedly non-classical (i.e. intuitionis-
tic) conception of logic.
We require, see below, that both the assertion and denial are in-
formative. The preconditions for assertion and denial ensure that
the asserted/denied sentence conveys new information relative to the
speaker’s (public) commitment store. Thus, it amounts to undertak-
ing a commitment.
1. S ASSERTS sentence φ to A
Precondition not ΓS ` φ
Postcondition Γ+S is set to Γ
+
S ∪ {φ}
2. S DENIES sentence φ to A
Preconditions not ΓS a φ
Postconditions
Γ−S is set to Γ
−
S ∪ {φ}
3. S ASKS REASON FOR ASSERTION φ to A
Preconditions (a) φ ∈ Γ+A and (b) not 〈Γ+A − {φ},Γ−A〉 `NM φ
8 This system is obtained by addition of the following four rules for negation
to [26], along the lines of Rumfitt’s [30] bilateral logic: (1) From Γ ` ¬φ
to Γ a φ, (2) from Γ a ¬φ to Γ ` φ, (3) from Γ a φ to Γ ` ¬φ and (4)
from Γ ` φ to Γ a ¬φ.
Postconditions Ξ+A is set to Ξ
+
A ∪ {φ}
4. S ASKS REASON FOR DENIAL φ to A
Preconditions (a) φ ∈ Γ−A and (b) not 〈Γ+A,Γ−A − {φ}〉 aNM φ
Postconditions Ξ−A is set to Ξ
−
A ∪ {φ}
5. S RETRACTS ASSERTION OF φ
Precondition φ ∈ Γ+A
Postcondition Γ+A is set to Γ
+
A − {φ}
6. S RETRACTS DENIAL OF φ
Preconditions φ ∈ Γ−A
Postcondition Γ−A is set to Γ
−
A − {φ}
4.8 Sanctionable Behaviour
An interlocutor’s behaviour in a dialogue or subdialogue is sanction-
able, if at the end of the (sub)dialogue, the interlocutor’s set of pos-
itive and/or negative open challenges (Ω+ and/or Ω−) is non-empty
and/or their commitment store (consisting of positive and negative
commitments Γ+ and Γ−) is inconsistent.9
4.9 The Inferential Background
We says that a judgement J holds relative to a set B of rules (i.e.,
the inferential background which underwrites meaning-giving infer-
ences) if J can be derived using B.
We discern three types of rules: entry, inference and exit rules. An
entry rule is of the form:
(1) Test
Judgement
In particular, we have:
(2)
φ ∈ Γ+
〈Γ+,Γ−〉 ` φ
and
(3)
φ ∈ Γ−
〈Γ+,Γ−〉 a φ
These rules say that a sentence φ is (monotonically) affirmed/refuted
if it is a member of the agent’s positive/negative commitments. In the
context of the game, this means that the agent must have asserted or
denied φ explicitly (and not retracted it subsequently). We assume
that at the outset of a game, the positive and negative commitments
of an agent are empty, i.e. Γ = 〈∅, ∅〉
There are also entry rules which allow us to introduce information
from observations:
(4)
Observation+(φ)
〈Γ+,Γ−〉 ` φ
9 This notion is intended only as a first approximation and would need to be
made relative to the inferential capabilities of the members of the commu-
nity in which the sanctions are issued. Without such a refinement, interlocu-
tors would be expected to have access to all the inferential consequences
of a dialogue act, both to be able to comply with the game and to judge
others’ compliance. This seems rather unrealistic. Additionally, one is, ar-
guably, more blameworthy for a direct contradiction, then a contradiction
that arises via a significant number of inference steps, suggesting that the
severity of sanctions may depend on this factor.
(5)
Observation−(φ)
〈Γ+,Γ−〉 a φ
In these cases, the sentence φ will correspond, in everyday vernacu-
lar, with an expression of the form ’It looks F to me’ or ’It looks like
an F to me’ (e.g., ‘It looks red to me’ or ‘It looks like a bird to me’).
A specific instance would be:
(6)
Observation+(look penguin tweety)
〈Γ+,Γ−〉 ` look penguin tweety
We can understand Observation+(look penguin tweety) as a
simple classification device, which returns ‘yes’ if Tweety looks like
a penguin.10 Of course, the fact that Tweety has been classified as
looking like a penguin, doesn’t necessarilly mean that he is a pen-
guin; we return to this issue below.
Next, we have inferential rules of the form:
(7) Judgement1 . . . Judgementn
Judgement
with n ≥ 1
These include, among other things, monotonic material inferences
such as the inference from Tweety is a penguin to it’s a bird:
(8)
Γ ` penguin tweety
Γ ` bird tweety
They can also express incompatibilities, e.g., if Tweety is bird then it
isn’t a mammal:
(9)
Γ ` bird tweety
Γ a mammal tweety
Importantly, the conditional part of a rule (above the line) can include
judgements which express that the rule has a limited scope; i.e. that it
is only applicable in certain situations. These conditions refer to the
rule itself. For example, we may have:
(10)
Γ ` bird tweety Γ ` scope bird tweety fly
Γ ` fly tweety
These scope conditions for rules play a special role in non-monotonic
inferences which we explain further on. Yet another rule that we will
make use of is:
(11)
Γ ` penguin tweety Γ ` scope penguin tweety fly
Γ a fly tweety
This can be paraphrased as: Provided the scope condition of this rule
is satisfied (i.e., there is no reason to think that the rule doesn’t ap-
ply), we conclude from Tweety being a penguin the denial of Tweety
being able to fly.
Additionally, we use what are essentially ‘blocking’ rules. The fol-
lowing rule tells us that if Tweety is a penguin, then the situation is
beyond the scope of rule (10) about birds flyings.
10 In practice, this would be a more general classifier that can distinguish
between situations in which a penguin is present and those in which there
is no penguin. Note that labelling the sentences that this classifier deals
with as ‘X looks like an F ’ only makes sense given the context where
they are then inferentially linked to sentences that express ‘X is an F ’.
Here, the account is in agreement with Sellars’s [31] point that being able
to make claims of the form ‘X looks like an F ’ is dependent on the ability
to make claims of the form ‘X is an F ’.
(12)
Γ ` penguin tweety
Γ a scope bird tweety fly
We can also use scope conditions in the formulation of rules which
takes us from what things look like to actual claims about what
they are. Such inferences are non-monotonic (e.g. it is possible that
though Tweety looks like a penguin, it is a different type of bird that
has been painted to look like a penguin).
(13)
Γ ` look penguin tweety Γ ` scope look penguin tweety
Γ ` penguin tweety
Finally, we have exit rules to actions of the form:
(14) Judgement1 . . . JudgementnAction with n ≥ 1
Such rules will typically be defeasible and can be used to justify enti-
tlement to an action. We mention these for the sake of completeness,
but won’t use them in what follows.
4.10 Non-monotonic Inference
We define sc(B) as the set of sentences which occur in B and which
express scope conditions of rules. These are atomic sentences. Their
meaning derives purely from our definitions of non-monotonic affir-
mation/refutation and the role they play in the inference rules: they
can be used to indicate the scope of a rule, and have inferential rela-
tions with other sentences, as in rule (12), which allows a scope con-
dition to be denied under certain circumstances and, consequently,
the corresponding rule to be blocked.11
Non-monotonic affirmation (‘`NM ’) and non-monotonic refuta-
tion (‘〉 aNM ’) are defined as follows:12
(Non-monotonic affirmation) 〈Γ+,Γ−〉 `NM φ iff there is a sub-
set SC of sc(B) such that (a) 〈Γ+ ∪ SC,Γ−〉 ` φ, (b) 〈Γ+ ∪
SC,Γ−〉 is consistent, and (c) not 〈Γ+,Γ−〉 aNM φ
(Non-monotonic refutation) 〈Γ+,Γ−〉 aNM φ iff there is a subset
SC of sc(B) such that (a) 〈Γ+∪SC,Γ−〉 a φ, (b) 〈Γ+∪SC,Γ−〉
is consistent, and (c) not 〈Γ+,Γ−〉 `NM φ
11 As pointed out by one of the reviewers of this paper, the sentences in sc(B)
could be viewed as part of the logical vocabulary, thereby invalidating the
claim that our game is pre-logical. However, note that the sentences in
question operate as tacit assumptions: the interlocutors do not use them
in contributions to the game; in other words, these sentences do not need
to be part of their communication language. More generally, one may ob-
ject that the current proposal requires a logically expressive meta-language
in which the inference rules and predicates, such as Observation+, are
stated. This challenge can be addressed by reflecting on the role that the
meta-language plays here. This meta-language, with which we describe the
game of giving and asking for reasons, is not a communication language. It
is better thought of as part of a programming language which allows us to
express the practices of the (pre-logical) game in procedural/computational
terms. Ultimately, it is therefore intended as a recipe for physically imple-
menting the ability to play this game (i.e. as a computational device).
12 Non-monotonic affirmation and refutation are defined simultaneously.
This does, however, not involve an infinite regress. We may for exam-
ple establish that a sentence is non-monotonically affirmed by establishing
conditions (a) and (b) and establishing (c) by showing that for no subset
SC′ the conditions (a) and (b) for non-monotonic refutation hold (which
do not refer back to non-monotonic affirmation).
The reason for including clause (c) is that it allows us to deal with the Nixon
Diamond problem of defeasible logic – a further detailed discussion is beyond
the scope of this paper.
Non-monotonic affirmation/refutation allows us to jump to a conclu-
sion. We don’t need to have positive evidence that a scope condition
holds. The absence of information to the contrary is sufficient for it
to be used. We can assume that a scope condition for a rule holds,
as long as this doesn’t give rise to an inconsistency (in combination
with our other commitments). This means that we can apply the rule
(provided its other conditions hold as well).
Note that (in)consistency is itself defined using the monotonic
variants of affirmation and refutation (see Section 4.5).
5 Giving and Asking for Reasons: An Example
This section sketches an analysis of a dialogue fragment, consisting
of 8 contributions, in terms of the game of giving and asking for
reasons that we defined in the previous section.
c1. John: Tweety flies. ASSERT fly tweety
c2. Mary: Why? ASK REASON fly tweety
c3. John: It is a bird. ASSERT bird tweety
c4. John: Wait no, I take it back. RETRACT and
DENY fly tweety
c5. Mary: Why? ASK REASON DENIAL
fly tweety
c6. John: It is a penguin. ASSERT penguin tweety
c7. Mary: Why? ASK REASON
penguin tweety
c8. John: It looks like a penguin. ASSERT
look penguin tweety
After c1, Γ+John = {fly tweety}. c2 results in ΞJohn = ΩJohn =
{fly tweety}; the sentence fly tweety is now part of the open
challenges ΩJohn. John is obliged to answer by providing a rea-
son, otherwise his behaviour becomes sanctionable. In c3 he provides
bird tweety. So now, Γ+John = {fly tweety, bird tweety}. We
can remove fly tweety from John’s open challenges ΩJohn, since
〈{bird tweety}, ∅〉 `NM fly tweety. The inference goes through
via rule (10) and the fact that we can assume, without endangering
consistency, that scope bird tweety fly.
In c4, John both retracts fly tweety asserted at line c1, and
denies that fly tweety. Again (c5) Mary asks for a justification.
In c6, John responds with penguin tweety. With this new com-
mitment it is non-monotonically refuted that fly tweety, based
on Rule (11). Note that after penguin tweety has been added
to the commitments, it is no longer possible to consistently add
scope bird tweety fly. Rule (12) prevents this. This rule can be
thought of as saying that the general rule about birds no longer ap-
plies once we have the information that the bird under considera-
tion is a penguin. Penguins are beyond the scope of the general rule
about birds and flying (and consequently we no longer can derive
that Tweety can fly).
Mary also asks, in c7, for the justification of penguin tweety
and this is again supported through a non-monotonic inference. In
this case, the reply, c8, is warranted by Rule (13), which takes us
from evidence for Tweety looking like a penguin to the (defeasible)
conclusion that Tweety is a penguin.
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper started with a number of puzzles and problems for the
classical truth-conditional conception of meaning. I argued that to-
gether they suggest that it may be profitable to explore an alterna-
tive computational/inferential approach along the lines of Brandom’s
‘Making It Explicit’ [6].
I presented a proof-theoretic formalisation of such an approach
in which assertion and denial are on an equal footing – as briefly
discussed, the resulting system is classical rather than intuitionistic.
The other major departure from existing mainstream proof-theoretic
accounts of meaning, especially of mathematical statements, is the
formalisation of defeasible inferences (using rules that can be un-
blocked and blocked by means of scope conditions).
Defeasible inference plays a key role in addressing the puzzle of
the use of meaning in perception. I show how defeasible inference
allows us to loosen the connection between perception and inference
(as required by the puzzle), whilst still explaining how observations
can lead to the entry of sentences into an inference.
The puzzle of truth-conditionally equivalent sentences is ad-
dressed by taking inferential steps, rather than truth, as our primitive.
Working out the justifications and consequences of a sentence (its
meaning) against the body of background rules B requires computa-
tional effort, making visible differences in meaning that are not ap-
parent from a truth-conditional point of view.13 By grounding mean-
ing in inferential practices, it also becomes possible to get a handle on
meaning change, by modelling these as changes to inferential prac-
tices.This includes the possibility of modelling defective practices:
when interlocutors encounter inconsistency, the blame doesn’t nec-
essarilly need to be assigned to their commitments; it might be that
the inferential practices themselves are flawed and need revision.
The game of giving and asking for reasons that is studied in this
paper brackets out concerns with how interlocutors arrive at a com-
mon ground (i.e. manage to acquire common or shared commit-
ments). In this respect, the current proposal is complementary to for-
malisations in logic and formal linguistics of dialogue state dynam-
ics (e.g. [14, 13, 9, 20, 3, 12]) and further work is needed to combine
these (e.g. along the lines proposed by Kibble [17]).
The main challenge I intend to address in future work is that of
building a computer implementation of the current proposal, includ-
ing the account of defeasible inference.
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